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Abstract—The growing number of applications for distributed
ledger technologies is driving both industry and academia to
solve the limitations of blockchain, particularly its scalability
issues. Recent distributed ledger technologies have replaced the
blockchain linear structure with a more flexible directed acyclic
graph in an attempt to accommodate a higher throughput.
Despite the fast-growing diffusion of directed acyclic graph
based distributed ledger technologies, researchers lack a basic
understanding of their behavior. In this paper we analyze the
Tangle, a directed acyclic graph that is used (with certain
modifications) in various protocols such as IOTA, Byteball,
Avalanche or SPECTRE.
Our contribution is threefold. First, we run simulations in
a continuous-time model to examine tip count stability and
cumulative weight evolution while varying the rate of incoming
transactions. In particular we confirm analytical predictions on
the number of tips with uniform random tip selection strategy.
Second, we show how different tip selection algorithms affect
the growth of the Tangle. Moreover, we explain these differences
by analyzing the spread of exit probabilities of random walks.
Our findings confirm analytically derived predictions and provide
novel insights on the different phases of growth of cumulative
weight as well as on the average time difference for a transaction
to receive its first approval when using distinct tip selection algo-
rithms. Lastly, we analyze simulation overhead and performance
as a function of Tangle size and compare results for different tip
selection algorithms.
I. INTRODUCTION
Satoshi Nakamoto, Bitcoin’s creator(s), proposed a new
decentralized payment system [1] based on a trustless peer-
to-peer network. Bitcoin is essentially a protocol for reaching
consensus on a chronologically ordered log of transactions
called a blockchain. This data structure is now a cornerstone
of many other Distributed Ledger Technologies, or DLTs for
short, [2], [3], [4], [5]. Blockchain based DLTs are finding
applications in other fields, ranging from financial services
such as digital assets, remittance, and online payments to
smart contracts, public services, reputation systems, and data
marketplaces [6].
However, blockchains have inherent scalability limitations:
since transactions, or blocks, are limited in size and frequency,
blockchains have a limited throughput. This issue hinders the
adoption of cryptocurrencies in contexts such as the Internet
of Things (IoT) [7].
To overcome scalability issues, several techniques have been
proposed ranging from increasing block size and frequency to
sidechains [8], “layer-two” structures like Lightning Network
[9], Sharding [10], and different consensus mechanisms, [3],
[4], [11].
In an attempt to increase throughput, some recent DLT’s
have replaced the blockchain with a DAG, a directed acyclic
graph. This approach is used in IOTA [12] and other new
protocols; see [13], [14], [15], [16], [17], [18], [19], [20]. DAG
based protocols reach consensus on a partially ordered log of
transactions, which in turn, allow the log to have “width” and
increase the throughput of the system.
In this paper, we focus on the DAG based IOTA protocol
introduced in [12], although our results may have wider
applications. In this DLT, transactions are recorded in a DAG
dubbed the Tangle. The vertices in the Tangle are transactions.
If there is an edge between transactions x← y, we say that y
approves x, and we say that y indirectly approves x if there is
a directed path from y to x. A transaction with no approvers is
called a tip. Under the protocol discussed in [12], all incoming
transactions attach themselves to the Tangle by approving two
(not necessarily distinct) tips.
A critical aspect of the Tangle is the algorithm used to
select the tips which a new transaction will attach itself to.
Several such algorithms are discussed in [12]. The Uniform
Random Tip Selection, or URTS, is the most simple algorithm:
we simply select a tip from the set of all available tips with a
uniform random distribution. Another algorithm is the Monte
Carlo Markov Chain or MCMC: here we select the tip at the
end of a random walk1 beginning at the first transaction in the
Tangle. The random walk can be biased towards transactions
with large cumulative weight [12, Section 4.1] and the amount
of bias is determined by a parameter α ≥ 0. When α = 0, we
dub the MCMC as Unbiased Random Walk or URW. When
α > 0, we dub the MCMC as Biased Random Walk or BRW.
In this article, we will primarily focus on the URTS and
URW selection algorithms. However, we also discuss BRW
in section III-D.
For a transaction x, we study the cumulative weight of
x, which is2 one plus the number of transactions indirectly
approving x [12, Section 2]. We observe that the cumulative
1We actually mean an antiwalk, i.e. a walk moving backwards along the
arrows.
2The definition in [12, Section 2] is more complex and allows for some
transactions to weighted by their proof of work. However, this simplified
definition is more suitable for this paper and is also the one currently used in
IOTA.
weight experiences two phases of growth, first exponential and
then linear, confirming the predictions of [12, Section 3.1]. We
also study the number of tips in the Tangle and note that with
both tip selection algorithms this number fluctuates around a
constant value. For various rates of incoming transactions, we
record the average and standard deviation of the number of
tips. We also analyze the time until a transaction receives its
first approval, and we observe the average time is higher under
URW. We also study the distributions of exit probabilities,
which is the probability of selecting a particular tip given a
specific tip selection algorithm. Lastly, we discuss how the
performance and computational overhead of our simulations
depend on the tip selection mechanisms and compare the
results of both.
The results give insight into the basic behavior of the
Tangle and are important for developing and evaluating the
performance and security of the Tangle based protocols. For
instance, the number of tips and time until first approval
are related to computing the throughput of the system. Also,
the security of the system depends upon preventing attackers
from manipulating the growth of the cumulative weight of a
transaction after making a conflicting transaction.
The other published works related to the Tangle focus on
other areas. Bramas [21] analyses the security of the IOTA
protocol, and studies the confirmation level of a transaction x,
i.e. the probability of selecting a tip which indirectly approves
x. More recently, Zander et al., [22] propose a continuous
time and multi-agent simulation framework for DAG-based
cryptocurrencies. Their result focuses on the transaction at-
tachment probabilities and shows that agents with low latency
and high connection degree have a higher probability of having
their transactions accepted in the network. Recently, in [23]
Ferraro et al. propose a new tip selection algorithm combining
both URTS and BRW.
The paper is organized as follows: In Section II we introduce
the Tangle and discuss basic concepts such as cumulative
weight and tip selection mechanisms. We follow with Section
III where we present our results on cumulative weights,
evolution of the number of tips, average time until the first
confirmation and overhead of simulations. The presented data
shows noticeable differences in Tangles grown employing
either URTS or URW, which is explained through the differing
shape of exit probabilities. In Section IV, we discusses tip
selection algorithms and the safety of the network. Lastly, in
Section V we conclude our findings.
II. THE TANGLE
The Tangle [12], [24] is a directed acyclic graph, growing
over time. The graph begins with an initial transaction called
the genesis. As discussed in the introduction, each incoming
transaction creates two edges to (i.e. approves) two previous,
nonconflicting tips. Thus, the Tangle never forms any cycles,
as showed by Fig. 1, and the genesis is always a minimum or
terminal element.
In order to issue a previous transaction, a node must do
proof of work, i.e. solve a cryptographic puzzle. A similar
1
2
1
4
2
5
6
(a)
1
1
2
5
6 1
2
3
7
(b)
Fig. 1. Examples of the Tangle. Transactions are represented by squares
and approvals by arrows. Tips (unapproved transactions) are shown in gray.
The cumulative weight of each transaction is in the top right corner of each
transaction. Parts (a) and (b) represent the Tangle before and after the new
transaction has arrived respectively.
mechanism is used in Bitcoin to control the frequency of
block creation. The proof of work takes time, and hence
there is a delay between the moment a transaction selects
two tips and when the transaction appears in the Tangle. This
delay increases while the transaction propagates throughout
the network. Let h > 0 be the total length of this delay. If
h = 0, the Tangle would be a chain, since there would only
ever be one tip. In this article, h is a constant, although we
could model it with a random variable.
The Tangle may fork due to conflicts. For example, suppose
a malicious actor double spends or makes two conflicting
transactions x1 and x2. Since new transactions cannot indi-
rectly approve both xi, two branches will form, with each
branch consisting of transactions approving a single xi.
In this case, users must choose which branch is the “true”
branch. To do this, we introduce the confidence level of a
transaction x which is the probability of the tip selection algo-
rithm selecting a tip indirectly approving x. The IOTA protocol
dictates that only transactions or branches with sufficiently
high confidence level should be trusted. This is akin to the
“6 block rule” in Bitcoin. Thus the tip selection algorithm
not only governs the growth of the Tangle, but is also the
mechanism which achieves consensus.
Attackers can potentially cheat the system by manipulating
the confidence level. One method of doing this is called the
“parasite chain attack;” see [12, Section 4.1]. The attacker
issues a transaction x in the main Tangle, paying a merchant
for goods or services. Meanwhile, the attacker issues transac-
tions which are invisible to the public, forming what we call
a parasite chain. The parasite chain contains a transaction y
which sends the money spent in x to a different account. After
the confidence level of x is high enough for the merchant
to accept and deliver goods or services, the attacker then
publishes the parasite chain.
If successful, the tip selection algorithm will favor the tips
of the parasite chain. Thus new transactions will approve
the double-spend y instead of x, and the parasite chain will
grow at the expense of the main Tangle. Meanwhile, the
confidence level of x decreases while the confidence level of y
becomes sufficiently high to be accepted by other users, thus
invalidating x.
In Section IV, we discuss how both URTS and URW are
susceptible to parasite chain attacks and thus are unsatisfactory
in the face of malicious actors. For these reasons, in its
current implementation, the IOTA protocol uses neither of
these tip selection algorithms and instead uses biased random
walks3. However, URTS and URW still warrant attention for
the following reasons.
1) The IOTA protocol is unable to enforce a particular tip
selection algorithm: a user may choose any algorithm
they like. Researchers are thus behooved to understand
a plethora of algorithms, in order to understand the
choices available to users and also to find the best
algorithms. The IOTA protocol is relatively new and
is not as extensively studied in published works. Thus
simple algorithms like URTS and URW are a natural
place for research to begin.
2) In the absence of a malicious actor, URTS and URW
have many desirable properties. In particular, URTS
minimizes the time until first approval of transactions:
see Subsection III-E. Furthermore, URTS requires sig-
nificantly less computational effort than a RW guided tip
selection. Moreover, both URTS and URW do not leave
orphans (valid transactions that never join the ledger).
This means that the throughput is only constrained by
the limits of the network. An optimal tip selection strat-
egy should both provide safety and have these properties.
3) Both URTS and URW are idealized version of the
Tangle and provide simplified scenarios and which are
easy to analyze. Furthermore URTS allows for analytical
derivations without considering the complex topological
structure of the Tangle. Similarly derivations in URW
disregard changes in cumulative weights4 which are im-
portant in biased random walks. As a result, simulations
of these algorithms have low overhead, see Section III-F,
and thus are easy to perform.
4) The biased random walk implemented in the IOTA
protocol is guided by small value of α parameter (see
section III-D). For suitably small α, the exit probabilities
of the random walks will be similar to URW unless
users attach tips to very old transactions. Thus without
malicious actors, the Tangle will grow similarly under
both tip selection algorithms.
3Currently, the protocol also uses a special node dubbed the coordinator
whose role it is to prevent double spend attacks. Eventually, the coordinator
will be removed in favour of a safe tip selection algorithm such as a BRW
with a proper value of alpha.
4The problem is harder because cumulative weights change with time.
As such URTS and URW are relevant models of the Tangle
when all of the participants of the network are acting honestly.
Other tip selection mechanisms that provide safety against
attackers should be examined further, however this discussion
is beyond the scope of this paper.
Note that the URW is not equivalent to URTS. Any random
walk on the Tangle is dependent on the topology of the DAG,
while the URTS does not. In fact, these differences can be
noticed in our simulations e.g. the average number of tips is
higher with URW than URTS; see Section III-B and III-E.
III. RESULTS
In this section, we present the results of our simulations.
We begin with analyzing the growth of cumulative weight and
then discuss the number of tips, L(t) as a function of time,
and also the time until the first approval. Lastly, we use exit
probabilities to explain observed differences in behaviours of
URTS and URW Tangles, and we also present the growth of
the simulations’ overhead as a function of txs in the Tangle.
The arrival of new transactions is modeled through the
standard approach of a Poisson point process [12]. We denote
the rate of this process by λ and assume that this rate
remains constant in time. Then the elapsed time between two
consecutive transactions is in turn given by the exponential
distribution Exp(λ).
Recall that h is the delay between a transaction selecting tips
and being added to the Tangle. Since h is measured in units
of time, and λ in transactions per unit of time, the properties
of the Tangle only depend on λ · h. Thus, we can fix our
time scale by setting h = 1, or equivalently we consider time
measured in units h. For simplicity, we omit the h throughout
the remainder of the paper.
In most cases, we focus on λ = 100, but some results are
presented with λ ranging up to 104. We chose these numbers
because they are the approximate orders of magnitude of the
protocol in high load regime. Simulations were performed for
Tangles with 105 − 107 transactions. We focus on the steady
state of the Tangle, thus, presented data are recorded after
an initiation phase of 50h from the Genesis. Some of the
presented data (Figs. 2, 4 and 7) are included to illustrate the
evolution of a single Tangle, however the remaining results
and figures are obtained by averaging over more than 103
simulation samples. Our results have a significance level of
0.01, corresponding to a confidence level of 99% with a width
of the confidence interval of, at most, 0.1% of the respective
mean value.
A. Cumulative weight
Supporting findings in [12, Section 3.1], the data suggests
that initially the cumulative weight of a transaction grows
exponentially during what is called the adaptation period, and
then grows linearly with slope λ; see Figs. 2(a) and 2(b).
This is the case for both examined tip selection algorithms,
URTS and URW. Fig. 3 shows that this behaviour is typical
of transactions under URW.
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Fig. 2. Cumulative weight of 200th issued transaction and the fitted linear and exponent functions (f(x) = ax + b, g(x) = exp(cx + d) respectively).
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Fig. 3. Average cumulative weight with the time since a transaction was
issued. Tip selection is URW and λ = 100..
These results are intuitive. Consider a new transaction x.
Initially, x will be approved by several new transactions,
and those transactions will again be approved by several
transactions. Thus the cumulative weight of x will initially
grow exponentially during the adaptation phase. However,
eventually most tips will indirectly approve x. At that point,
most incoming transactions will also indirectly approve x and
will contribute to its cumulative weight. So eventually the
cumulative weight of x will grow at the same rate as the
Tangle, i.e. linearly with slope λ.
Because our data is discrete and not continuous, the tran-
sition point between these growth phases is difficult to rig-
orously determine. However, by the previous discussion, we
know that it occurs when the confidence level is close to 100%.
B. Number of tips
The typical evolution of the number of tips, L(t), for URTS
and URW is presented in Figs. 4(a) and 4(b) respectively. In
both cases, L(t) is bounded and fluctuates around an average
TABLE I
AVERAGE NUMBER OF TIPS AND ITS STANDARD DEVIATION σ AS A
FUNCTION OF λ.
λ
URTS URW
EL σ EL σ
1 2.858 1.115 3.035 1.167
10 20.69 3.140 21.80 3.278
100 200.9 10.21 208.1 10.27
1000 1999 28.57 2079 34.36
10000 19983 86.28 20722 90.41
value. The dashed lines in the plots represent the standard de-
viation of the data. From these plots, we empirically construct
the probability density functions of L(t); see Fig. 5.
The empirical probability density functions are bell curves
and are presented in Fig. 5. The curve for URW shifted to
the right of URTS. Note that these histograms are not fitted.
Although not recorded here, simulations with other values of
λ yielded similar curves. The means and standard deviations
resulting from these simulations are displayed in Table I and
Fig. 6.
The results in Table I confirm the analytic predictions [12,
Section 3 Equation (1)] that the mean tip number for URTS is
2λ. For URW, the average value of L(t) is approximately 2.1λ
which is 3.5 − 4.5% higher than under URTS. Furthermore,
the standard deviation of the empirical probability density
of L(t) is proportional to the square root of λ; see Fig. 6.
The difference between the number of tips between URTS
and URW is interesting, since it demonstrates that the Tangle
grows differently with these tip selection algorithms. We
explore the reasons for the differences in Subsection III-E.
C. Time until the first approval
The average times until the first approval for URTS and
URW are presented in Table II. The data demonstrates that
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Fig. 4. Evolution of L(t), the number of tips at time t. λ = 100.
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Fig. 5. Empirical probability density function of the number of tips, L(t),
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Fig. 6. Average number of tips EL (and its standard deviation) as a function
of λ in log-log scale. It illustrates that the average (standard deviation) scales
linearly (as a square root) with the value of λ.
URTS provides slightly shorter times than URW (approxi-
mately 2 verses 2.1). Furthermore, the standard deviation of
this average is significantly smaller for URTS. Moreover, our
data agrees with the prediction made in the white paper for
URTS [12, Section 3].
The average time till approval is actually related to the
number of tips. Indeed, consider the following derivation in the
white paper [12, Section 3] for the average time approval under
URTS. Since λ is the rate of incoming transactions, and each
transaction approves two tips, all the tips combined receive
approvals at a rate of 2λ. Since a tip will be selected with
probability 1/L(t) under URTS, the rate, R, that it receives
approvers should be
R =
2λ
L(t)
. (1)
Let tA denote the average time till approval. Since tA includes
the 1h time delay, we have R = 1/(tA − 1) and thus
L(t) = (tA − 1)2λ. (2)
When L(t) = 2λ, we derive tA = 2.
This derivation does not follow for URW, or any other tip
selection algorithm, since the probability of each tip being
selected is not equal. In fact, we can see that the data in Tables
I and II does not support the relationship in Equation 2 under
URW. However, interestingly the values are not completely
dissimilar. It would be interesting to derive a general formula
relating L(t), λ, and tA.
For both considered tip selection algorithms, URTS and
URW, since the number of tips is constant every transaction
will eventually be approved almost surely. However, this may
not be the case with other tip selection algorithms. For example
simulations in [25] reveal that while using the tip selection
algorithm discussed in Section III-D, some transactions will
always remain tips, i.e. be permanent tips. Permanent tips
make computing the average time until approval problematic.
Since their approval time is infinite, they cannot be included
in the average, but excluding them may artificially decrease
TABLE II
AVERAGE TIME UNTIL THE FIRST APPROVAL AND ITS STANDARD
DEVIATION σ AS A FUNCTION OF λ.
λ
URTS URW
tA σ tA σ
1 2.884 1.951 3.042 2.464
10 2.075 1.082 2.177 1.482
100 2.009 1.011 2.087 1.349
1000 1.997 0.997 2.078 1.345
the average and lead to false conclusions.
D. Biased Random Walks
The IOTA protocol uses a random walk biased towards
transactions with large cumulative weight [12, Section 4.1].
The amount of bias is determined by a parameter α ≥ 0.
Specifically, the probability Pxy of transitioning
5 from x to y
with y → x when y approves x is
Pxy =
exp (αHy)∑
z:z→x exp (αHz)
(3)
where Hz denotes the cumulative weight of the transaction z
and the sum is taken over all transactions z which approve
x. We use BRW to denote the tip selection algorithm using
these biased random walks beginning at the genesis. BRW with
α = 0 is simply URW. We note that both URW and BRW are
special cases of the Monte Carlo Markov chain algorithms
proposed in [12].
The transition probability in (3) is similar to the Gibbs
distribution from physics [26], where cumulative weight plays
the role of the energy6 of state (or transaction in our case)
and α is the inverse temperature of the system. When α is
large, the system is “cold” and random walks move only along
a relatively small number of paths with the highest weight
transactions. On the other hand, when α is small, the system
is “hot” causing particles to move more chaotically.
Fig. 7 shows that the number of tips grows linearly even for
small values of α > 0. When α is large, paths of random walks
gravitate towards paths with the highest cumulative weight,
increasing the likelihood that certain tips would be approved.
These tips then gain more approvers, their cumulative weight
grows, and then they again pull the random walks in their
direction. Meanwhile, other tips are becoming increasingly
less likely to receive approvers and remain tips longer, even
as fresh tips still continue to arrive. Thus the tip number
increases, explaining the trend in Fig. 7. Transactions whose
cumulative weight growth has stalled, i.e. they have not been
directly or indirectly approved for an excessive amount of
time, are considered orphaned. Since their confidence level
5Recall that our walks move backwards through the Tangle, moving from
approvee to approver.
6Or actually negative energy (energy multiplied by −1), since the walks
gravitate to higher cumulative weights, just like thermodynamical systems
tend to favor states of smaller energy.
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Fig. 7. Evolution of L(t), the number of tips at time t. λ = 100; Biased
random walk with α = 0.003. The growth of the tip number is linear and
for illustration fitted by f(x) = a · x+ b.
tends to zero these transactions are not considered as part of
the consensus.
E. Exit probabilities
For a vector of available tips tp = (tp1, tp2, ...), a tip
selection algorithm determines a corresponding vector of exit
probabilities p = (p1, p2, ...) where pi is the probability
that the tip tpi will be selected. We call these values exit
probabilities. Since
∑
i pi = 1, the exit probabilities define a
probability space on the set of tips.
For any algorithm using a random walk, the corresponding
exit probabilities will generally not be equal because the
topology of the underlying graph is not uniform.
We illustrated the phenomenon in Fig. 8, where we present
what we dub the adjusted average exit probability of the i-
th most probable tip for a Tangle with λ = 100 and for
different tip selection algorithms. The plot is constructed in
the following way. We simulate 103 Tangles. For each of these
samples we calculate the exit probability distribution on the
last set of tips by running the tip selection algorithm 106 times.
We then order these measured exit probabilities from greatest
to smallest. Since the number of tips will vary between the
different samples, for each sample, we extend with zeroes the
ordered exit probability vector p¯ to the maximum observed tip
number. Finally we average these vectors over all simulation
runs. Hence, due to the variation in the tip number, the curves
show a decaying trend for the higher indices.
The more the exit probabilities between individual tips vary,
the steeper the slope of the curve in Fig. 8. Because of outliers
in the sampling and varying tip numbers, the curve is not flat
even for URTS. In Fig. 8, the curves for α = 0 and α = 0.001
closely overlap whereas the curve for α = 0.1 differs. This
suggests that when α = 0 and α = 0.001 the Tangle should
evolve similarly because the exit probabilities determine the
growth. Currently α = 0.001 is used in the IOTA protocol,
specifically in the IOTA Reference Implementation; see IOTA
Git Hub repository [27, line 816]. The similar behaviour of
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Fig. 8. Comparison of the adjusted average exit probability of the i-th most
probable tip, for λ = 100 and different tip selection algorithms: URTS, URW
and BRWs (α = 0.001, 0.1).
Tangles with URW and this value of α used in IOTA Reference
Implementation justifies our focus in this article on URW: see
Section II, point 4).
As we previously demonstrated, the average tip number and
the time till first approval is increased for URW compared to
URTS. This is associated with the different exit probabilities
on the tips, since the average flow rate of direct approvals of
a tip tpi is proportional to the probability pi. Therefore, when
the pi are not equal, some transactions will receive more direct
approvals, and other tips will wait much longer for their first
approval. In fact, this is why we observe that URTS provides
on average a shorter time until first approval. This is because
exit probabilities for URTS are maximally spread out.
F. Performance evaluation
In this section we compare how tip selection algorithms
affect performance in terms of the computational overhead.
This information is relevant for the actual implementation
of Tangle based DLTs because the simulation complexity is
similar to the actual protocol implementation performance
complexity. Preferably, tip selection mechanism should be
as efficient as possible, especially if the considered protocol
wants to accommodate many transactions per second, such
as in platforms created for IoT markets. We run simulations
varying the total number of transactions, and we measure
the time required to complete the simulation using a) URTS;
b) BRW with cumulative weight update; c) URW without a
cumulative weight update. Fig. 9 and Table III summarize our
results. The red curve corresponds to URTS based simulation.
The green and cyan curves correspond to the BRW and URW
based simulation with and without an update of cumulative
weight respectively, and we fit times with functions a) a · x;
b) b · x2; c) c · x2 respectively.
Simulation performance when using URTS only depends on
the number of tips, which is bounded and on average equal
to ≈ 2λ. Since we can disregard the cumulative weights in
this setting, the computational overhead grows linearly with
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The computational overhead for URTS grows linearly (linear fit with black
dashed line), whereas with URW and BRW the overhead grows proportionally
to the square of the total number of transactions (square function fit, blue and
gray dashed lines).
the number of transactions in the Tangle, thus with time
complexity of order O(n).
On the other hand, the performance of simulations based
on URW depends on the length of the random walk, which
increases linearly with the Tangle size, leading to a square rela-
tionship between the computational overhead and the number
of transactions in the Tangle with a time complexity of order
O(n2).
Similarly, BRW depends on the length of the random walk
as well as on the cumulative weight of all the transactions, and
so as new transactions enter the Tangle, the cumulative weights
of all approved transactions need to be updated. Thus, when
cumulative weights are updated using depth first search of
the Tangle, the time needed to run simulations grows like the
square of the number of transactions in the Tangle, resulting
in a time complexity of order O(n2).
Overall, both BRW and URW curves grow quadratically
with the number of transactions, although simulations with
URW are less demanding.
TABLE III
COMPUTATIONAL OVERHEAD OF SIMULATIONS BASED ON URTS, BRW
AND URW TIP SELECTION ALGORITHMS.
Tip selection algorithm Time complexity
URTS O(n)
BRW with cumulative weight update O(n2)
URW without cumulative weight update O(n2)
IV. TIP SELECTION MECHANISM AND SAFETY OF THE
NETWORK
Both URTS and URW are theoretical tip selection algo-
rithms and should be treated merely as a tool to study the
Tangle. As discussed in Section II, neither of them can be
used in a real-life implementation of DAG based DLT, because
Parasite Chain
Main Tangle
(a)
Parasite Chain
Main Tangle
(b)
Fig. 10. The examples of parasite chains attacks which will be successful
against URTS (part (a)) and URW (part (b)). Conflicting transactions are in
red.
they are not safe against parasite chain attacks. In this section,
we illustrate why. The arguments in this section are known
to experts on the Tangle, however they have never been
published.
In the case of URTS, the attacker proceeds in the following
manner. After placing the first double spend transaction in
the main part of the Tangle, the attacker secretly issues the
second double spend transaction. The rest of the parasite chain
consists of tips approving the second double spend and some
other transaction; see Fig. 10 part (a). The attacker publishes
the parasite chain as soon as it has significantly more tips than
the main Tangle. Then most of the honest users will approve
the second double spend transaction.
Both the white paper [12, Section 3 Equation (1)] and our
simulations (see Section III-B) show that the number of tips in
the main Tangle is stable and is around 2λ. Thus the attacker
is guaranteed to be able to produce more parasitic tips.
URW provides protection against this type of parasite chain,
(see part (a) of the Fig. 10) because URW is unaffected by a
number of tips in each of the sub-Tangles.
However, URW can be attacked with the following parasite
chain displayed in Fig. 10 part (b). First, the attacker chooses
a set Y of transactions in the main Tangle such that every
path from the genesis to a tip passes through an element in
Y . Then, in secret, the attacker issues a transaction x0, and
then issues a sequence of transactions x1, x2, x3, . . . such that
each xi directly approves xi−1 and some transaction in Y.
Suppose that transactions are accepted once their confidence
level is greater than some κ ∈ (0, 1). The attacker continues
until for each y ∈ Y , the proportion of direct approvers of
y in the parasite chain is greater than κ. Then they issue a
transaction y double spending x. After the confidence level of
y is greater than κ, the attacker publishes the parasite chain.
At this point, the probability of a random walk ending on
the parasite chain is greater than κ. Moreover once on the
parasite chain, the random walk cannot move out of it and
must approve x0. Thus the confidence level of x0 is greater
than κ, and the attack is successful.
The parasite chains discussed in this section however are
foiled by the biased random walks discussed in Section III-D.
Indeed, biased random walks are less influenced by small
changes in the Tangle, and thus an attacker must use a large
amount of hashing power to effectively attempt an attack.
A BRW with higher α provides more safety. Indeed, the
main tangle will always be heavier than any parasite chain,
assuming of course that the attacker does not control a majority
of the hashing power. Thus, the larger α is, the more biased
random walks are inclined to stay on the main tangle and
eschew any parasite chains. However, a large α value also
leads to a higher orphanage rate of transactions, see Section
III-D. Hence an optimal selection of the value of α should
ensure both the safety as well as the liveness of the protocol.
V. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we introduced and discussed several of the
basic concepts and properties of the Tangle, such as tips, tip
selection algorithms, and cumulative weight. We focused on
the Uniform Random Tip Selection (URTS) which selects tips
with uniform probability from the set of available tips, and the
Unbiased Random Walk (URW) which uses a random walk
beginning at the genesis. Our results confirms that cumulative
weight grows in two phases: an initial phase of exponential
growth, followed by a linear phase during which the transac-
tion is indirectly approved by effectively all new transactions.
We found that the average value of tips agrees well with the
theoretically predicted value for URTS and hence our data
justifies the approximations used in the derivation of these
predictions. Moreover our simulations reveal that the average
number of tips is higher with URW than URTS and that URW
increases the time till first approval by a similar ratio. We than
explain this behaviour by providing the numerically obtained
exit probabilities, which are hard to calculate analytically. We
also considered some biased random walks (BRW) and showed
their relationship with permanent tips.
Finally, we discussed and compared the computational
overhead of our simulations when using URTS, URW, and
BRW. Our results show that time complexity of simulations
based on URTS grows linearly with the size of the Tangle
and are significantly more efficient than simulations based on
both URW and BRW, whereas their time complexity exhibit
quadratic growth.
This information is relevant in implementation of nodes
operating DLTs based on the Tangle. We believe these results
can serve as a fundamental ground to analyze and improve the
research and development of DAG-based DLTs. In particular,
to compute the IOTA throughput we must know the probability
that the confidence level of a transaction will tend to 0, which
is related to the evolution of the number of tips. We also would
like to understand the time it takes for the confidence level to
approach 1, a number dependent on the time till first approval.
Lastly, the security of the Tangle depends on the inability of
an attacker to manipulate the confidence level of transactions.
However, with the biased random walks, the confidence level
is essentially determined by the cumulative weights.
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